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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This case requires us to determine whether the United 
States lacks prosecutorial authority over the presentation of 
falsified records to U.S. officials and other related deception 
that occurred while a defendant was docked in the Delaware 
Bay port because the crimes sought to be covered up were 
committed on the high seas.  We hold that, although Vastardis 
cannot be convicted in a U.S. Court for crimes occurring in 
international waters, the convictions here were based on the 
presence of inaccurate records in U.S. waters.  Accordingly, 
the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction even though 
the actual entries may have been made beyond the jurisdiction 
of the United States while on the high seas. 
 
 Nikolaos Vastardis, a citizen and resident of the 
Republic of Greece, appeals his conviction and sentence for 
crimes that allegedly took place while he was Chief Engineer 
onboard a Liberian-registered petroleum tanker named the 
Evridiki.  Vastardis was convicted of four offenses related to 
maritime pollution: failing to maintain an accurate Oil Record 
Book from December 8, 2018 to March 11, 2019 in violation 
of 33 U.S.C. § 1908(a) (Count 1); falsifying high-seas Oil 
Record Book entries in violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Count 2); obstructing justice in the Coast 
Guard’s investigation of the Evridiki in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1505 (Count 3); and making false statements in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Count 4).  The District Court imposed a 
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$7,500 fine, a $400 special assessment, and three years’ 
probation.  As a condition of probation, Vastardis was barred 
from entering the United States or applying for any visas to 
enter the United States. 
 
 For the following reasons, we will affirm the 
convictions.  However, we will vacate the portion of the 
District Court’s sentence that precludes Vastardis from 
entering the United States while under court supervision. 
 
I. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON MARITIME 
POLLUTION 
 
The United States is a signatory to the 1973 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships1 and the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships.2  Both 
treaties relate to pollution on the high seas.  Together, these 
treaties are referred to as “MARPOL” (short for “Maritime 
Pollution”), and their collective aim is to “achieve the complete 
elimination of international pollution of the marine 
environment by oil and other harmful substances.”3 
 
MARPOL is enforced by U.S. federal statute through 
the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (“Act to Prevent 
Pollution”), which criminalizes violations of MARPOL.  The 
Act to Prevent Pollution designates the country in which a ship 
is registered as the “flag state,” and the country receiving the 
 
1 Nov. 2, 1973, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184. 
2 Feb. 17, 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61. 
3 1340 U.N.T.S. at 128. 
5 
 
ship as the “port state.”4  Under MARPOL and the Act to 
Prevent Pollution, a ship’s flag state may prosecute a violation 
“wherever the violation occurs.”5  By contrast, port states have 
jurisdiction over foreign ships only for conduct that occurs in 
their ports or waters and may only refer evidence of a foreign 
ship’s high-seas misconduct to the flag state.6  The Act to 
Prevent Pollution also authorizes the Coast Guard, an agency 
of the United States Department of Homeland Security, to 
“prescribe any necessary or desired regulations to carry out the 
provisions of . . . MARPOL.”7 
 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
During ordinary operation, oceangoing petroleum 
tankers accumulate large volumes of oily wastewater in their 
bottoms (“bilges”), engine rooms, and mechanical spaces, 
which can potentially pollute the ocean.  Regulations 
promulgated pursuant to the Act to Prevent Pollution 
accordingly prohibit tank vessels of 150 gross tons or more 
from discharging oily bilge water into the sea, unless (1) the 
discharge contains less than 15 parts per million (“ppm”) of oil; 
and (2) the vessel has in operation certain pollution control 
equipment, including an Oily Water Separator that both filters 
waste and has an Oil Content Meter for monitoring waste levels 
in the discharge.8  The Oil Content Meter is part of the Oily 
Water Separator and it monitors samples of wastewater about 
to be discharged.  It is designed to sound an alarm and 
 
4 United States v. Abrogar, 459 F.3d 430, 432 (3d Cir. 2006).  
5 MARPOL Art. 4(1)–(2), 1340 U.N.T.S. at 185. 
6 Id. Art. 6(2), 1340 U.N.T.S. at 187; Abrogar, 459 F.3d at 432.  
7 33 U.S.C. §§ 1903(c)(2), 1907. 
8 33 C.F.R. § 151.10; MARPOL Annex I, Reg. 15. 
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automatically stop a discharge if the discharge contains more 
than 15 ppm of oil.  Any bilge water that exceeds that pollution 
level must be retained by the vessel and taken to a “reception 
facility.”9  
 
To track a ship’s pollution, MARPOL and applicable 
regulations require tank vessels to “maintain an Oil Record 
Book.”10  The Oil Record Book is a running log that includes 
detailed entries for every onboard oil transfer operation.  
Regulations require the Oil Record Book to include entries for 
each tank-to-tank transfer of oil; each discharge of oily bilge 
water; each failure of oil filtering equipment; and any 
accidental or emergency discharge of oily waste exceeding the 
legal limit.11  Regulations also require that individual 
line-by-line entries in the Oil Record Book be made without 
delay “on each occasion” that an oil operation occurs.12  These 
entries must be signed by the person in charge of that operation, 
such as the supervising engineer, who is responsible for 
“maintenance” of the Oil Record Book.13  
 
Nikolaos Vastardis was the Chief Engineer responsible 
for maintaining the Oil Record Book while onboard the 
Evridiki, a Liberian-registered 84,796-gross ton petroleum 
tanker.  On March 11, 2019, the Coast Guard inspected the 
Evridiki after it entered the Delaware Bay port.  They soon 
 
9 33 C.F.R. § 151.10; MARPOL Annex I, Reg. 14.  
10 33 C.F.R. § 151.25(a). 
11 33 C.F.R. § 151.25; MARPOL Annex I, Reg. 17. 
12 33 C.F.R. § 151.25(h). 
13 33 C.F.R. § 151.25(j). 
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became suspicious of the ship’s Oil Content Meter.14  After 
docking and inspecting the ship’s international oil pollution 
prevention certificate, Coast Guard Officer Aaron Studie asked 
Vastardis to run the vessel’s Oily Water Separator as he would 
at sea, to confirm its operability.  The crew turned on the Oily 
Water Separator, and the Oil Content Meter displayed a 
reading of 0 ppm of oil.  Vastardis responded by giving Studie 
“two thumbs up.”15  Studie was skeptical.  He noticed that the 
valve supplying the discharge to the Oil Content Meter was 
closed, preventing the Oil Content Meter from testing the 
actual sample discharge.  When that valve was opened, the 
 
14 Vastardis Br. at 7–10.  Vastardis argues that the United 
States had no right to investigate the Evridiki because a valid 
international oil pollution prevention certificate was presented 
and no clear ground for further investigation was identified at 
the time of inspection, citing 33 U.S.C. § 1904(d) 
(investigation “is limited to verifying whether or not a valid 
certificate is onboard, unless clear grounds exist, which 
reasonably indicate that the condition of the ship or its 
equipment does not substantially agree with the particulars of 
the certificate.”).  However, in addition to its authority to 
confirm that a “valid [international oil pollution prevention] 
Certificate is on board,” the Coast Guard also has the authority 
to confirm that the “condition of the ship and its equipment 
corresponds substantially with the particulars of the 
[international oil pollution prevention] Certificate” to 
determine whether the ship has discharged oil in violation of 
MARPOL, and to examine “the Oil Record Book, the oil 
content meter continuous records, and [conduct] a general 
examination of the ship.”  33 C.F.R. § 151.23.  Accordingly, 
federal statute authorized the Coast Guard’s investigation. 
15 Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) ¶ 34. 
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reading remained at 0 ppm.  This surprised Studie because in 
his experience, a flat 0–2 ppm reading indicated that the Oil 
Content Meter was testing a sample of freshwater.  If the Oil 
Content Meter were testing filtered oily bilge water, one would 
expect to see a fluctuating reading of 3–10 ppm.  As Officer 
Studie tried to understand the anomaly, he physically traced the 
sample line until it reached behind the Oily Water Separator.  
There, he discovered a hidden valve that was also closed, 
blocking the Oily Water Separator sample from flowing 
through the Oil Content Meter.  Once this valve was opened, 
the Oil Content Meter immediately jumped to a reading of 40 
ppm or higher.  This triggered an audible alarm and caused the 
Oily Water Separator to go into recirculation mode.  
 
 After discovering the ship’s hidden valve, Officer 
Studie reviewed the Oil Content Meter’s memory chip to 
decipher the ship’s past actions.  He observed that the memory 
chip read a flat 0–2 ppm throughout the duration of all the 
recent discharges.  Vastardis had recorded those discharges in 
the Oil Record Book as properly running through 15 ppm 
equipment.  Officer Studie then realized that, given the 
configuration of the Evridiki’s Oily Water Separator, if the 
sample line were closed, the Oil Content Meter could be made 
to sample freshwater trapped in the device instead of the oily 
bilge water being discharged overboard.  This explained why 
the Oil Content Meter displayed a reading of 0–2 ppm during 
the inspection, as well as the history recorded on the memory 
chip.  Those recent discharges could not have been made 
through the 15 ppm Oil Content Meter equipment.  Officer 
Studie suspected that during high seas operations, Vastardis 
“was keeping the valve closed and preventing the [Oily Water 
Separator’s] oil content meter [from] getting an adequate 
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sample.”16  When the other Coast Guard officer conducting the 
inspection asked Vastardis what the position of the sample line 
valve was during normal operations, Vastardis repeatedly 
asserted that he always ran the Oily Water Separator with the 
valve in the “open” position.17 
 
 Between March 11–13, 2019, Coast Guard officers 
seized all of the ship’s Oil Record Books for investigation.  
They duplicated all onboard computers and analyzed the Oil 
Content Meter’s memory chip in greater depth.  The analysis 
revealed that since 2018, the ship’s Oily Water Separator 
operated 16 times, for a total of 55.5 hours, including on March 
8, 2019, just three days before the inspection.18  The Oil Record 
Book showed that Vastardis ran at least ten of those operations, 
discharging more than 62,000 gallons of oily bilge water into 
the ocean.19  The Government claims that Vastardis falsified 
the ship’s required Oil Record Book in order to indicate that 
the ship’s oily waste discharges had been properly filtered and 
monitored through required pollution control equipment when 
the waste had actually bypassed the equipment on its way 
overboard.20 
 
After the expanded inspection, the Coast Guard brought 
an in rem proceeding against the vessel under 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1908(d) and (e).  The Coast Guard sought criminal fines for 
 
16 Vastardis Br. at 11 (citing Motion Tr. at 42:23; omitted from 
App-II). 
17 Supp. App’x. at 14-15. 
18 PSR ¶ 38. 
19 Gov’t’s Sent’g Memorandum and Opposition to Defendant’s 
Motion for Variance, ECF 166 at 4; Supp. App. at 84. 
20 Gov’t Br. at 1. 
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any violation of the Act to Prevent Pollution and claimed that 
the Government was entitled to a bond or other surety, 
including human surety, under § 1908(e).21  The ship and her 
entire crew were detained while the Coast Guard negotiated an 
Agreement on Security, insisting that the crewmembers 
“remain within the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court – 
District of Delaware,” and attend “meetings with . . . [U.S.] law 
enforcement personnel” until a Government lawyer “advises 
that their presence is no longer necessary.”22  After being held 
for the better part of a month without process, Vastardis and 
his thirty-two fellow foreign crewmembers petitioned for 
habeas relief in April 2019.23  Ten days later, the Government 
filed a criminal complaint against Vastardis and secured ex 
parte material witness arrest warrants for the other ten 
crewmembers pledged as human surety.24  Over the 
Government’s objection, these witnesses were eventually 
allowed to give depositions and return to their homes overseas, 
subject to their agreement to return for trial unless at sea. 
 
Vastardis was later charged in a four-count indictment 
with violations of the Act to Prevent Pollution and its 
regulations and for obstruction in connection with the Coast 
Guard inspection: (1) knowingly causing the failure to 
maintain an accurate Oil Record Book, aiding and abetting, in 
 
21 33 U.S.C. § 1908 (d) and (e) provide criminal and civil 
penalties for certain persons who violate the MARPOL 
Protocol and allow the violating vessel to be seized and held 
“upon the filing of a bond or other surety satisfactory to the 
Secretary [of the Treasury].”   
22 App-II at 8–9. 
23 App-I at 8. 
24 Id. at 11. 
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violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1908(a), 33 C.F.R. § 151.25, and 18 
U.S.C. § 2; (2) falsification of records, aiding and abetting, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519 and 2; (3) obstruction of justice, 
in presenting false Oil Record Book entries and deceiving 
inspectors, aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1505 and 2; and (4) false statements in connection with a 
federal investigation, aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 2.   
 
Vastardis moved to dismiss the indictment and to 
suppress evidence obtained during the inspection, but the 
District Court denied both motions.  After a seven-day trial, a 
jury convicted him on all counts.  Vastardis moved for 
judgment of acquittal based on sufficiency of the evidence, 
which the District Court denied.  At sentencing, the District 
Court imposed a $7,500 fine, a $400 special assessment, and 
three years’ probation, a condition of which was banishment 
from the United States and U.S. waters.  This appeal followed. 
  
III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over 
Vastardis’s prosecution for federal crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231. We have appellate jurisdiction over the District Court’s 
final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We also have 
jurisdiction in sentencing appeals under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
 
The parties raise several issues on appeal, each of which 
warrants a different level of review.  We review the 
Government’s various statutory and legal arguments on the 
application of the Act to Prevent Pollution de novo.25  
 
25 United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 2013). 
12 
 
Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, we afford 
“deference to a jury’s findings” and draw “all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the jury verdict.”26  With regard to the 
confiscation of Evridiki’s Oil Record Book, we review the 
denial of Vastardis’s motion to suppress for clear error as to the 
underlying factual findings and exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s application of the law to those facts.27  
Finally, we review Vastardis’s challenge to the substantive 
reasonableness of his sentence under an abuse-of-discretion 
standard.28  
 
IV. MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
 
As an initial matter, Vastardis argues that the District 
Court erred in denying his motion to suppress the Oil Record 
Book entries because they were unlawfully obtained by the 
U.S. Government.29  In denying Vastardis’s motion, the 
District Court concluded that “[b]inding Third Circuit 
precedent holds that the Coast Guard can conduct a 
warrantless search of a vessel given reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity.”30  We analyze Vastardis’s argument in three 
steps: (1) “we ask whether a Fourth Amendment event, such 
as a search or seizure, has occurred”; (2) “we consider whether 
 
26 United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 329 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(internal citations omitted). 
27 United States v. Burnett, 773 F.3d 122, 130 (3d Cir. 2014). 
28 See United States v. Richards, 674 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 
2012). 
29 Vastardis Br. at 51–53; see also Defs.’ Joint Motion to 
Suppress, App-II at 112. 
30 App-I at 54 (citing United States v. Varlack Ventures, Inc., 
149 F.3d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
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that search or seizure was reasonable; and (3) if it was not, we 
then determine whether the circumstances warrant suppression 
of the evidence.”31  We conclude that, even assuming  there 
was a seizure, it was reasonable.  And even if unreasonable, 
the violation would not have warranted the suppression of the 
Oil Record Book entries.   
  
Under 14 U.S.C. § 522(a), the Coast Guard has broad 
authority to inspect vessels and, in certain circumstances, to 
make searches and seizures, “upon the high seas and waters of 
which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, 
detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the United 
States.”  As noted by the District Court, we have held that 
Section 522(a) authorizes “warrantless searches of vessels in 
U.S. territorial waters based solely upon a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity.”32  The Coast Guard also has 
specific authority to inspect vessels, including Oil Record 
Books, for compliance with MARPOL and the Act to Prevent 
Pollution, and it may expand such an inspection if “clear 
grounds exist which reasonably indicate that the condition of 
the ship or its equipment does not substantially agree with the 
particulars of” the ship’s MARPOL certificate.33  
 
31 United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 731 (3d Cir. 2010).  
32 United States v. Varlack Ventures, Inc., 149 F.3d 212, 214 
(3d Cir. 1998) (interpreting 14 U.S.C. § 89(a), now codified at 
14 U.S.C. § 522(a)); see also United States v. Benoit, 730 F.3d 
280, 284 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A] reasonable suspicion 
requirement for searches and seizures on the high seas survives 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny.” (citation and quotation marks 
omitted)).  
33 33 U.S.C. § 1904(d); see also id. § 1907(c)(2)(A); 33 C.F.R. 
§ 151.23(a)(1), (c); Abrogar, 459 F.3d at 432.  
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The Coast Guard’s preliminary examination of the Oil 
Record Book and Oily Water Separator was within its 
inspection authority under the Act to Prevent Pollution.  When 
the officers realized the Oily Water Separator was not filtering 
oil and observed prior Oil Content Meter readings showing 0 
–2 ppm, and when Vastardis appeared to conceal the fact that 
the Oily Water Separator was not operable, the officers had 
clear reason to suspect a criminal violation of the Act to 
Prevent Pollution.  Given that reasonable suspicion, the 
warrantless seizure of the Oil Record Book was justified. 
 
Vastardis argues that the Act to Prevent Pollution 
regulations provide that the United States, like all port states, 
is authorized only to copy foreign books—not to seize them.  
Annex I of MARPOL states: 
 
The competent authority of the Government of a 
Party to the present Convention may inspect the 
Oil Record Book Part I on board any ship to 
which this Annex applies while the ship is in its 
port or offshore terminals and may make a copy 
of any entry in that book and may require the 
master of the ship to certify that the copy is a true 
copy of such entry.  Any copy so made which has 
been certified by the master of the ship as a true 
copy of an entry in the ship’s Oil Record Book 
Part I shall be made admissible in any judicial 
proceedings as evidence of the facts stated in the  
15 
 
entry.  The inspection of an Oil Record Book Part 
I and the taking of a certified copy by the 
competent authority under this paragraph shall 
be performed as expeditiously as possible 
without causing the ship to be unduly delayed.34 
The Government argues that while the MARPOL Annex 
authorizes certified copies, it does not preclude the Coast 
Guard’s statutory authority to seize Oil Record Books.35  
Meanwhile, the Act to Prevent Pollution slightly modifies the 
language from the MARPOL Annex: 
 
An inspection under this section may include an 
examination of the Oil Record Book, the oil 
content meter continuous records, and a general 
examination of the ship.  A copy of any entry in 
the Oil Record Book may be made and the 
Master of the ship may be required to certify that 
the copy is a true copy of such entry.36 
Even if Vastardis were correct and only copying the Oil 
Record Book entries was permitted, that violation would not 
have required the suppression of the Oil Record Book.  
MARPOL allows a copy of the Oil Record Book to be made 
and a properly certified copy can surely be admitted as 
evidence in a judicial proceeding.  Therefore, the 
Government’s certified copy of the book would have put the 
same evidence in front of the jury.37  Accordingly, the District 
 
34 MARPOL, Annex I, Reg. 17 ¶ 7. 
35 Gov’t Br. at 45. 
36 33 C.F.R. § 151.23(c). 
37 See United States v. Wright, 777 F.3d 635, 641 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(affirming the denial of a motion to suppress because the 
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Court did not err in allowing the Oil Record Book entries into 
evidence, despite the records having been obtained, rather than 
copied, by the Government. 
 
V. COUNT 1 – FAILURE TO MAINTAIN AN OIL 
RECORD BOOK 
 
Count 1 of the indictment charged that “[o]n or about 
March 11, 2019, at the Big Stone Anchorage, Delaware Bay, 
Delaware,” Vastardis “knowingly . . . cause[d] the failure to 
maintain an accurate Oil Record Book for the M/T 
EVRIDIKI,” in violation of 33 C.F.R. § 151.25, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1908(a), and 18 U.S.C. § 2.38  Sections 151.25 (d) and (j) of 
the Code of Federal Regulations require that: “[E]ntries shall 
be made in the Oil Record Book on each occasion . . . 
whenever any of [certain specified] machinery space 
operations take place . . . . The master . . . shall be responsible 
for the maintenance of [the Oil Record Book].” 
 
 
Fourth Amendment violation “had no impact on the evidence 
that could be deployed against [the defendant] at trial” since 
“the agents would have collected precisely the same evidence, 
and [the defendant] would have been unable to stop them”); 
United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 245 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(explaining that under the inevitable discovery doctrine, 
information that would have been discovered by lawful means 
should not be suppressed.).    
38 App-I at 38–39.  On each count, the Government charged 
Vastardis with aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2. 
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Section 1908(a) of the United States Code states: 
 
A person who knowingly violates the MARPOL 
Protocol, Annex IV to the Antarctic Protocol, 
this chapter, or the regulations issued thereunder 
commits a class D felony. In the discretion of the 
Court, an amount equal to not more than ½ of 
such fine may be paid to the person giving 
information leading to conviction. 
The Oil Record Book entries in question falsely documented 
bilge water discharges that occurred when the Evridiki was on 
the high seas.  Vastardis argues that this divests the United 
States of the authority to enforce the penalties prescribed under 
MARPOL because the Act to Prevent Pollution is limited to 
conduct while in the navigable waters of the United States.  We 
disagree.  Instead, we—like some of our sister circuit courts—
find that the arrival of the Evridiki in the Delaware Bay 
triggered the duty under Coast Guard regulations to “maintain 
an Oil Record Book” while in U.S. waters,39 which brought 
Vastardis’s conduct within U.S. jurisdiction under the Act to 
Prevent Pollution. 
 
The word “maintain” in this context requires that the 
records be substantively accurate.  Merriam-Webster’s 
Dictionary defines “maintain” as, inter alia, “to keep in a state 
of repair, efficiency, or validity.”40  The recordkeeping 
 
39 33 C.F.R. § 151.25(a). 






provision would make little sense if, as Vastardis proposes, it 
required that ships only physically possess an Oil Record Book 
in any state of completeness or accuracy.  Because an Oil 
Record Book must be accurately maintained under § 151.25, 
and because § 151.25 applies to foreign ships while they are in 
U.S. waters or in a U.S. port, the arrival in U.S. waters or a 
U.S. port of a ship with an inaccurate Oil Record Book 
constitutes a violation of that regulation.  The Act to Prevent 
Pollution makes it a felony to violate that regulation 
knowingly.41 
 
Two of our sister circuit courts—the Second and Fifth 
Circuits—have adopted this plain reading in holding that “the 
requirement that an oil record book be ‘maintained’ . . . 
impos[es] a duty upon a foreign-flagged vessel to ensure that 
its oil record book is accurate (or at least not knowingly 
inaccurate) upon entering the ports of navigable waters of the 
United States.”42  In both cases, the United States prosecuted 
the defendants under § 1908(a) for knowingly maintaining Oil 
Record Books in a U.S. port that falsely documented high-seas 




41 33 U.S.C. § 1908(a).  
42 United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398, 403 (5th Cir. 2008); see 
also United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555 F.3d 303, 306 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“[W]e join the Fifth Circuit in holding 
that [§ 151.25] imposes a duty on ships, upon entering the ports 
or navigable waters of the United States, to ensure that its [Oil 
Record Book] is accurate (or at least not knowingly 
inaccurate).”). 
43 Ionia, 555 F.3d at 305; Jho, 534 F.3d at 402–03. 
19 
 
conclusion, the Second and Fifth Circuits rejected the 
argument that the obligation to “maintain” an Oil Record Book 
in U.S. waters imposes no substantive accuracy requirement.44  
In the recordkeeping context, “the duty to ‘maintain’ plainly 
means a duty to maintain a reasonably complete and accurate 
record,” and “[n]o reasonable reader of [§ 151.25] could 
conclude, given the context, that the regulation merely imposes 
an obligation to preserve the [Oil Record Book] in its existing 
state.”45 
 
One of our own cases similarly supports this plain 
reading.46  In United States v. Abrogar, we articulated this 
offense as the “knowing failure to maintain an accurate oil 
record book within U.S. waters.”47  As here, the improper 
discharges occurred outside U.S. waters, and Abrogar falsely 
documented them while he was outside U.S. waters.48  After a 
Coast Guard inspection uncovered the ship’s conduct, Abrogar 
 
44 Ionia, 555 F.3d at 307–09; Jho, 534 F.3d at 403. 
45 Ionia, 555 F.3d at 309. 
46 Because we find the text of the Act to Prevent Pollution and 
MARPOL to be unambiguous, Vastardis’s reliance on the rule 
of lenity is unavailing.  See United States v. Kouevi, 698 F.3d 
126, 138 (3d Cir. 2012) (“The rule of lenity applies in those 
situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute’s 
intended scope even after resort to the language and structure, 
legislative history, and motivating policies of the statute.”) 
(citation omitted). 
47 459 F.3d at 435 (internal quotation marks omitted).  We did 
not have occasion to squarely address the Government’s 
jurisdiction to prosecute the offense, as Abrogar pleaded 
guilty. 
48 Id. at 433, 436.   
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pleaded guilty to failing to maintain an accurate Oil Record 
Book as required by § 151.25, in violation of § 1908(a).49  
Although we vacated the District Court’s imposition of a six-
level sentencing enhancement for an offense that “resulted in 
an ongoing, continuous, or repetitive discharge, release, or 
emission of a pollutant into the environment,”50 this was 
because the high-seas discharges did not constitute “relevant 
conduct” for purposes of determining Abrogar’s offense level 
under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.51  The crime was, as 
here, the failure to maintain an accurate oil record book while 
in a U.S. port.  Accordingly, Abrogar’s offense did not “result[] 
in” any pollution, as required for the enhancement.52 
 
Contrary to Vastardis’s assertion, allowing the United 
States to prosecute this recordkeeping violation does not flout 
the division of authority set forth in MARPOL and the Act to 
Prevent Pollution.  Rather, it adheres to that careful division 
and preserves the integrity of MARPOL.  To be sure, Vastardis 
is correct that MARPOL vests power in flag states to prosecute 
high-seas misconduct “wherever the violation occurs.”53  But 
MARPOL still vests concurrent jurisdiction to port states over 
conduct in their ports or waters.54  Because the gravamen of 
Vastardis’s crime occurred in the Delaware Bay port, it is 
appropriate for U.S. prosecution under MARPOL.  Port states 
also play a key role in detecting (if not prosecuting) such 
 
49 Id. at 433.  
50 Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.3(b)(1)(A)).  
51 Id. at 437.  
52 Id. at 436.  
53 MARPOL Art. 4(1)–(2), 1340 U.N.T.S. at 185. 




misconduct.  Indeed, the ability of port states to refer violations 
to flag states hinges on the reliability of foreign ships’ Oil 
Record Books, which port officers like the Coast Guard review 
in conducting inspections.55  If foreign ships were free to 
maintain falsified Oil Record Books in U.S. ports, then “the 
Coast Guard’s ability to conduct investigations against foreign-
flagged vessels would be severely hindered,” allowing those 
vessels “to avoid detection.”56  Ships could carry two Oil 
Record Books: one accurate Oil Record Book for flag-state 
inspection, and one falsified Oil Record Book for port-state 
inspection.  Under such a system, port states “would be 
severely hampered in their ability to report violations to the 
flag state for enforcement, and the international system of 
reporting and accountability under MARPOL would 
collapse.”57 
 
The jury convicted Vastardis on Count 1 after receiving 
an instruction that, to do so, it must find that the offense 
occurred “while the . . . Evridiki was in the navigable waters 
of, or at a port or terminal of the United States.”58  Because the 
Government was within its jurisdiction to prosecute the ship’s 
failure to maintain an accurate Oil Record Book in a U.S. port, 
we will affirm that conviction. 
 
 
55 See Abrogar, 459 F.3d at 432 (“In conducting inspections, 
the Coast Guard typically relies on a ship’s oil record book and 
statements of the crew.”); Jho, 534 F.3d at 403 (“Accurate oil 
record books are necessary to carry out the goals of MARPOL 
and the [Act to Prevent Pollution].”).  
56 Jho, 534 F.3d at 403. 
57 Ionia, 555 F.3d at 308.  
58 App-II at 318–19. 
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VI. COUNT 2 – FALSIFYING RECORDS, SARBANES-
OXLEY 
 
Count 2 of the indictment charged Vastardis with 
violating 18 U.S.C. § 1519 based on the falsified Oil Record 
Book.  Section 1519 makes it a crime to knowingly “conceal[], 
cover[] up, or make[] a false entry in any record . . . with the 
intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or 
proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of 
any department or agency of the United States, . . . or in 
relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case.”59 
 
Vastardis argues that the Government failed to prove 
that he acted with the requisite specific intent of impeding a 
U.S. investigation because his falsification of the Oil Record 
Book would have been done with the intent to impede only a 
Liberian investigation, since only Liberia had jurisdiction to 
prosecute a recordkeeping offense.  This argument fails. 
 
The Coast Guard had statutory authority to conduct a 
compliance inspection and examine the ship’s Oil Record 
Book while it was in the Delaware Bay.  “While at a port or 
terminal under the jurisdiction of the United States, a ship is 
subject to inspection by the Coast Guard . . . [t]o determine 
whether a ship has been operating in accordance with and has 
not discharged any oil or oily mixtures in violation of the 
provisions of MARPOL.”60  Such an inspection “may include 
an examination of the Oil Record Book.”61  MARPOL itself 
 
59 18 U.S.C. § 1519. 
60 33 C.F.R. § 151.23(a); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1904(c)-(d); 
MARPOL Art 6(2), 1340 U.N.T.S. at 187. 
61 33 C.F.R. § 151.23(c); see also Abrogar, 459 F.3d at 432.  
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authorizes a port state to “inspect the Oil Record Book on 
board any ship . . . while the ship is in its port or offshore 
terminals.”62 
 
Under § 1519, “[i]t is sufficient that the ‘matter’ [under 
investigation] is within the jurisdiction of a federal agency as a 
factual matter.”63  The Government must prove only that “(1) 
[the defendant] intended to impede an investigation into ‘any 
matter’ and (2) the matter at issue was ultimately proven to be 
within the federal government’s jurisdiction.”64  The 
Government is “not required to prove that [the defendant] 
intended to obstruct or impede a specific federal 
investigation.”65  An Oil Record Book inspection by the Coast 
Guard is plainly a matter within its jurisdiction, and other 
circuit courts have affirmed § 1519 convictions for falsified Oil 
Record Books that were recorded on the high seas but 
presented to U.S. officials in port.66 
 
62 MARPOL Reg. 20(6), 1340 U.N.T.S. at 212. 
63 United States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192, 210 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Yielding, 657 
F.3d 688, 714 (8th Cir. 2011)).  
64 Id. 
65 Id.  
66 See, e.g., United States v. Oceanic Illsabe Ltd., 889 F.3d 178, 
185–86 (4th Cir. 2018); Ionia, 555 F.3d at 310; see also United 
States v. Taohim, 817 F.3d 1215, 1222 (11th Cir. 2013) (per 
curiam) (affirming § 1519 conviction in a similar context, 
rejecting the ship captain’s argument that “he could not have 
intended to impede . . . the Coast Guard’s investigation when 
he allegedly ordered the omission of [a] discharge from the 
garbage record book because at that time, the vessel was 




Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the 
Government, the evidence was sufficient to prove that 
Vastardis acted with the requisite intent to impede “any 
matter”—namely, an eventual inspection of the Oil Record 
Book.  Vastardis was an experienced chief engineer 
responsible for signing Oil Record Book entries; he entered 
and signed the false Oil Record Book entries, he brought the 
Oil Record Book to the master for his signature before the 
ship’s arrival in the Delaware Bay port, and the ship itself 
requested the Coast Guard inspection so that it could offload 
its cargo.  Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could 
conclude that Vastardis “knowingly falsified documents in 
‘contemplation of’ an investigation of a ‘matter,’ which was 
proven to be within the jurisdiction of the federal 




not require that an investigation be pending or that the 
defendant be aware of one when he falsifies the record”). 
67 Moyer, 674 F.3d at 211.  Other courts of appeals have 
affirmed § 1519 convictions on similar records.  See, e.g., 
Taohim, 817 F.3d at 1222 (explaining that a reasonable jury 
could credit testimony that the defendant was an experienced 
“old sea dog” and was “aware that the garbage record book 
would be reviewed during any Port State Control Inspection” 
as evidence that the book was “falsified ‘in contemplation of’ 
a future Port State Control Inspection”); Oceanic Illsabe, 889 
F.3d at 190 (citing evidence that the Oil Record Book 
“contained a plethora of inaccurate and false information, and 
. . . a vast amount of inculpatory information had not been 
properly recorded therein”). 
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VII. COUNT 3 – IMPEDING A GOVERNMENT 
PROCEEDING 
 
Count 3 charges Vastardis with obstructing justice 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1505.  Section 1505 imposes criminal 
liability upon anyone who: 
 
corruptly . . . obstructs, or impedes or endeavors 
to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and 
proper administration of the law under which any 
pending proceeding is being had before any 
department or agency. 
To convict under this section, the Government must 
establish: “(1) that there was an agency proceeding; (2) that 
the defendant was aware of that proceeding; and (3) that the 
defendant intentionally endeavored corruptly to influence, 
obstruct or impede the pending proceeding.”68  The term 
“proceeding” in the context of § 1505 is construed broadly and 
encompasses agency investigative activities—including an 
agency’s “search for the true facts.”69 
 
Count 3 charged that, during the Coast Guard’s 
inspection of the ship’s oil filtration equipment, Vastardis “ran 
the Oil Content Meter with the sample line closed in order to 
trick the system into reporting an oil content of less than 15 
 
68 United States v. Smukler, 991 F.3d 472, 483 n.7 (3d Cir. 
2021) (quoting United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 325 
(6th Cir. 2010)). 
69 See United States v. Leo, 941 F.2d 181, 199 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(quoting United States v. Browning, Inc., 572 F.2d 720, 724 
(10th Cir. 1978)). 
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ppm” and, “when asked by [Coast Guard] inspectors to 
describe the position [of] the [Oil Content Meter] sample line 
valve during at-sea operations,” he “falsely stated that the 
valve was ‘open.’”70  The Act to Prevent Pollution regulations 
authorize Coast Guard inspections not only “[t]o determine 
that a valid [international oil pollution prevention] Certificate 
is on board,” but also “[t]o determine whether a ship has been 
operating in accordance with and has not discharged any oil or 
oily mixtures in violation of the provisions of MARPOL.”71  
These regulations put ships on notice that inspections “may 
include an examination of the Oil Record Book, the oil content 
meter continuous records, and a general examination of the 
ship.”72  A Coast Guard inspection in a U.S. port is a 
“proceeding in the manner and form prescribed for conducting 
business before” that agency, and § 1505 reaches “all steps and 
stages in such an action from its inception to its conclusion.”73  
Thus, contrary to Vastardis’s argument, the Coast Guard’s 
authorized investigation, even as an administrative inspection, 
is a “proceeding” within the meaning of § 1505.74  We 
therefore will affirm Vastardis’s conviction on Count 3. 
 
70 App-I at 40–41 (under seal). 
71 33 C.F.R. § 151.23(a)(1), (a)(3). 
72 Id. § 151.23(c). 
73 Leo, 941 F.2d at 199 (quoting Rice v. United States, 356 F.2d 
709, 712 (8th Cir. 1966)). 
74 See United States v. Technic Services, Inc., 314 F.3d 1031, 
1044 (9th Cir. 2002) (“An administrative investigation is a 
‘proceeding’ within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1505.” 
(citation and quotation marks omitted)), overruled on other 
grounds by United States v. Contreras, 593 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en banc); see also Taohim, 817 F.3d at 1221 (affirming 




VIII. COUNT 4 – FALSIFYING A MATERIAL FACT 
 
Count 4 charged Vastardis with making false statements 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.  Section 1001 imposes 
criminal liability upon anyone who: 
 
knowingly and willfully--falsifies, conceals, or 
covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a 
material fact; makes any materially false, 
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or 
representation; or makes or uses any false 
writing or document knowing the same to 
contain any materially false, fictitious, or 
fraudulent statement or entry. 
Count 4 charged that, while at the Big Stone Anchorage in 
Delaware, Vastardis stated that when the ship’s Oily Water 
Separator was run at sea during normal operations, the valve 
on the sample line to the Oil Content Meter was “open” when 
in fact it was closed.75  
 
 
inferred that [the ship’s captain] knew that the garbage record 
book did not include the discharge of plastic into the sea and 
that he made that fraudulent book available to the Coast Guard 
with the intent to interfere with its investigation”); Oceanic 
Illsabe, 889 F.3d at 189 & n.18, 190 & n.19 (citing evidence 
that ship’s crew lied to Coast Guard inspectors about the 
functioning of the ship’s equipment as supporting § 1505 
convictions). 
75 App-I at 41–42. 
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Here again, Vastardis argues that § 1001 does not apply 
because the matter being investigated was not within the 
jurisdiction of the Coast Guard, and that his conduct was only 
governed by Liberian law.76  He is wrong.  As the Government 
correctly notes, the actions relied upon for Count 4 were made 
during the inspection of the Evridiki while Vastardis was in the 
Delaware Bay port and thus were subject to the Coast Guard’s 
jurisdiction.  Moreover, the crew of the Evridiki requested the 
inspection in order to receive a certification necessary to 
operate in the United States.  Accordingly, the Coast Guard’s 
inspection, including its inquiries about the accuracy of the Oil 
Record Book entries and the related operability of the ship’s 
equipment, fell well within the Coast Guard’s jurisdiction.77  
 
Although Vastardis insists that the valve was open, the 
Government introduced evidence that it was closed.78  
Vastardis’s representation that the valve was open was clearly 
material to the Coast Guard’s inquiry, and it was false.  If the 
sample line had been even partially open—as Vastardis had 
told the inspectors—the Oil Content Meter would have 
detected oily wastewater.  Yet the reading on the Oil Content 
Meter was instead 0–2 ppm.  At trial, the Government proved 
that the Oil Content Meter had in fact been sampling trapped 
fresh water and that Vastardis had run the Oily Water Separator 
with the sample line closed.  Given this evidence, which we 
view “in the light most favorable to the Government,” we find 
 
76 See Vastardis Br. at 2. 
77 See United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 481 (1984) 
(explaining that § 1001 reflects Congress’s interest in 
protecting the integrity of official inquiries, wherever there is 
a statutory basis for the inquiry). 
78 App-II at 251, 257–59. 
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that Vastardis did violate 18 U.S.C. § 1001.79  The District 
Court therefore did not err in denying Vastardis’s motion for 




Although we find no error among Vastardis’s 
convictions, the District Court clearly abused its discretion in 
applying banishment as a condition of Vastardis’s probation, 
when it stated that he may “not enter the United States, the 
waters of the United States, or apply for any [v]isas to enter 
the United States.”81  We have previously discussed the 
historical roots of banishment, summarizing it as a condition 
that “orders the probationer . . . to leave a broad geographic 
area.” 82  We have also held that a “condition of probation may 
not circumvent another statutory scheme.”83  Through the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), Congress outlined 
the sole and exclusive procedure through which foreigners 
may be deported from the United States.84 
 
While district courts generally have broad discretion to 
impose conditions of probation, such discretion must be 
viewed against the backdrop of the INA, which provides the 
Attorney General with exclusive authority to admit, exclude, 
 
79 United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 329 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
80 App-II at 182. 
81 App-II at 370. 
82 United States v. Abushaar, 761 F.2d 954, 960 (3d Cir. 1985). 
83 Id. 
84 See id. at 959. 
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and remove non-citizens.85  A district court abuses its 
discretion, circumvents the authority of the Attorney General, 
and oversteps the bounds of the judiciary when it imposes 
banishment as a condition of probation. 
 
Furthermore, the condition that Vastardis serve his 
probation outside the United States is unrelated to his 
rehabilitation or the protection of the public.  This is another 
reason why a sentence that imposes banishment is an abuse of 
discretion.86  Moreover, Vastardis is a seafarer whose career 
depends on travel in international waters, including U.S. 
waters.  Because the condition of banishment impinges upon 
freedom of movement and has the potential to drastically 
interfere with the livelihood of a foreign national, it should 





The United States had the authority to prosecute 
Vastardis.  Vastardis aided the ship’s presentation of a falsified 
Oil Record Book to U.S. officials and deceived them during an 
authorized inspection in an attempt to conceal the improper 
discharges.  Such behavior forms the basis of federal 
recordkeeping and obstruction offenses because it harms the 
United States and goes to the heart of its ability to uncover 
 
85 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (“Unless otherwise specified in this 
chapter, a proceeding under this section shall be the sole and 
exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be 
admitted to the United States or, if the alien has been so 
admitted, removed from the United States.”). 
86 Abushaar, 761 F.2d at 961. 
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wrongdoing.  Vastardis’s light sentence—a $7,500 fine and 
three years’ probation—reflects that his conviction reaches 
only his U.S.-based dishonesty and not his role in the ship’s 
discharges of oily bilge water into the ocean while on the high 
seas. 
 
With the exception of the condition of probation 
prohibiting Vastardis from entering the United States, we will 
affirm his conviction and sentence. 
